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Concept: measure behavior, not knowledge

Pretexta exists because the usual way of "doing security awareness" measures the wrong thing, and this document explains what Pretexta measures instead and why.

The problem with quiz-style awareness training

Most awareness tools ask employees multiple-choice questions: "Which of these is a phishing email?" The trouble is threefold.

  1. The answer is obvious. When one option is "URGENT: reset your password now" with a link and the others are a calendar invite and a newsletter, everyone picks the phish. The quiz measures whether someone knows the textbook answer, not whether they would act on it while busy. This is social-desirability bias: people answer the way they know they should.
  2. The base rate is 100% attack. In a quiz every item is an attack. In a real inbox, almost everything is legitimate, and the hard part is spotting the one fake among hundreds of real messages while doing your actual job.
  3. Suspicion is free. "Refuse everything" scores perfectly on a quiz. In a real workplace, refusing every request is also a failure mode — invoices go unpaid, colleagues get ignored.

Independent research backs this up. A controlled study of ~19,500 employees found that completing annual training had no significant relationship with failing a simulated phish, and embedded training moved the failure rate by only about 1.7 percentage points (Ho et al., IEEE S&P 2025). Verizon's DBIR has repeatedly found that reporting rate, not click rate, is the metric that tracks a resilient organization (recent-training groups reported at ~21% vs a ~5% baseline).

The takeaway: knowing the theory is not the same as behaving safely, and a tamper-proof quiz about the theory is still a quiz about the theory.

What Pretexta measures instead

Pretexta is built around behavior under realistic conditions, with the decision made on the server from what the trainee actually does — never from a self-reported score the browser could forge (see scoring.md).

Two surfaces carry this idea:

  • AI chat (lab). An open-ended roleplay against an adversarial persona. The outcome is decided by what the trainee types: leaking a secret or agreeing to the attacker's goal is a compromise; resisting under escalating pressure is a defense. There is no "pick the right answer" — the trainee has to actually hold the line in a conversation.
  • Live campaigns. Authorized phishing simulations in employees' real mailboxes, with an AI persona that continues the thread when someone replies. Here the base rate, the workload and the cost of over-caution are all real, because it is real email on a normal workday. The primary metrics are report rate and time-to-report, not click rate alone. See live-campaigns.md.

Where quizzes and scenarios fit

Quizzes and branching scenarios still exist, but as remediation and warm-up, not as the headline. Their scoring is now server-authoritative, so they cannot be gamed, but they remain lower-signal than the two surfaces above by design.

Two higher-signal exercises already sit alongside them:

  • Inbox triage — a realistic inbox mixing mostly legitimate mail with a few pretexts, where flagging a legitimate message costs points. Measures discrimination (d′), not recall. Deterministic, so it runs offline.
  • Free-text response — "what would you reply?" graded by an LLM against a rubric (did they verify through an independent channel, or ask the attacker "is this really you?"), scored server-side.
  • Consequence-driven scenarios — branches with no obviously-correct option and escalating pressure (the persona engine already tracks pressure_level).

Honest limits

  • While trainees know they are in a lab, no exercise perfectly predicts real-world click rates. Lab scores measure discrimination and verification discipline under pressure; they do not forecast "X% of staff will click." State this plainly rather than overclaiming.
  • Live campaigns reduce that gap because the conditions are real, but they require organizational authorization and care (see guardrails.md and ethics.md).

References

  • D. Ho et al., "Understanding the Efficacy of Phishing Training in Practice," IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2025.
  • Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), 2024–2025 — reporting-rate vs click-rate benchmarks.
  • R. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion — the six principles the content is organized around.