Produced by Opus 5.5 on day of disclosure (2026-11-17). All findings grounded in primary sources fetched and cross-checked.
| Field | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-114938 | OpenJDK advisory, Oracle CPU |
| Nickname | Java4Shell | calif.io, JFrog |
| Class | Heap out-of-bounds write → info disclosure / RCE | calif.io |
| Component | hotspot/compiler (C2 JIT intrinsic) |
OpenJDK advisory |
| Vulnerable fn | StubGenerator::generate_base64_decodeBlock(), src/hotspot/cpu/x86/stubGenerator_x86_64.cpp |
fix commit |
| Root cause | AVX-512 VBMI Base64 decode tail: pad-driven output_size underflow → bzhiq full mask → full 64-byte evmovdqub store |
source+commit |
| Fix | JDK-8393212, commit 5177a70b385c (2026-11-16): 3-line length<4 guard |
openjdk/jdk |
| CVSS v4.0 / v3.1 | 9.2 Critical / 8.1 High (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
calif.io / OpenJDK |
| Affected OpenJDK | 17, 21, 25, 27 (17.0.6+) | advisory, calif.io |
| Affected Oracle Java SE | 8u511b33-perf, 17.0.21.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 27.0.1.0.3 | Oracle CPU |
| HW precondition | x86-64 with avx512f,avx512bw,avx512vbmi,bmi2; ARM64 not affected |
calif.io |
| Credits | Quang Luong (Calif.io), Jenish Rakholiya; Albert Yang (Oracle ack) | calif.io, Oracle |
- 2021-06-25 — JDK-8268276: AVX-512 Base64 intrinsic committed to OpenJDK mainline (author: Scott Gibbons)
- 2022-11 — JDK-8296735: Backport to JDK 17 resolved (ships in 17.0.6, January 2023)
- 2023-12 — JDK-8321599: Related "data loss in AVX3 Base64 decoding" bug fixed (distinct from this CVE)
- 2026 (date unreported) — Quang Luong discovers CVE-2026-114938 using AI-assisted review (~1 hour to find, ~2 more hours to first exploit, <$200 in tokens)
- 2026-10-13 — Fix authored by Tobias Hartmann (commit
5177a70b385c) - 2026-11-16 19:52 UTC — Fix lands in master as
5177a70b385cunder benign title "8393212: Base64 optimization improvements" - 2026-11-17 ~13:00 PT — OpenJDK advisory, Oracle CPU, and calif.io disclosure publish together
- 2026-11-17 ~19:20 UTC — Independent reproduction by Upwind (confirmed overflow on Ice Lake)
Credits: Calif.io credits Quang Luong (research/writeup/exploits) and Jenish Rakholiya (exploit improvement). Oracle acks Quang Luong (Calif.io) and Albert Yang. Artwork by Michal Zalewski.
- Intrinsic generated by
generate_base64_decodeBlock()(fn @ L3155 of current master), wired asStubRoutines::_base64_decodeBlock, intrinsifyingjava.util.Base64$Decoder.decodeBlock. - Three engines: (1) AVX-512 VBMI fast path with masked
evmovdqubstores — vulnerable; (2) AVX2 fallback; (3)L_bruteForcescalar 4-byte decoder — bounds-correct. - Only emitted when CPU has AVX-512 VBMI (Intel Ice Lake/Sapphire/Emerald/Granite Rapids; AMD Zen 4+). ARM64 / non-VBMI x86 immune.
- Must be JIT-compiled: a cold/interpreted decode is safe; exploits and the PoC must warm the intrinsic first (~200k iterations).
| Condition | Requirement |
|---|---|
| CPU | x86-64 with AVX-512 VBMI + BW + F and BMI2 |
| JDK version | >= 17.0.6 (any distribution) |
| JIT state | C2 must have compiled the Base64 intrinsic |
| Decoder type | Basic decoder (Base64.getDecoder()) or URL decoder (Base64.getUrlDecoder()) |
| NOT affected | MIME decoder (Base64.getMimeDecoder()) bypasses this path |
| Input | Malformed Base64 ending in = with tail length 1-3 bytes past a 64-byte boundary |
| Java Version | Trigger String |
|---|---|
| 17 (17.0.6+) | "A" * 128 + "=" (129 bytes) |
| 21, 25, 27 | "A" * 64 + "=" (65 bytes) |
Line numbers from post-fix master; pre-fix layout identical minus the 3 guard lines.
__ BIND(L_finalBit);
// FIX (JDK-8393212):
__ cmpl(length, 4);
__ jcc(Assembler::less, L_bruteForce);
// ---
__ movq(rax, -1);
__ bzhiq(rax, rax, length); // input mask (L3405-3406)
__ movl(output_size, length);
__ shrl(output_size, 2); // length/4
__ lea(output_size, Address(output_size, output_size, Address::times_2, 0)); // *3
__ addq(length, start_offset);
__ cmpb(Address(source, length, Address::times_1, -1), '=');
__ jcc(Assembler::equal, L_padding);
__ BIND(L_donePadding);
__ subq(length, start_offset);
__ kmovql(input_mask, rax);
__ movq(output_mask, -1);
__ bzhiq(output_mask, output_mask, output_size); // OUTPUT MASK
...
__ kmovql(k1, output_mask);
__ evmovdqub(Address(dest, dp), k1, tmp, true, Assembler::AVX_512bit); // STORE__ BIND(L_padding);
__ decrementq(output_size, 1); __ shrq(rax, 1); // one '='
__ cmpb(Address(source, length, Address::times_1, -2), '=');
__ jcc(Assembler::notEqual, L_donePadding);
__ decrementq(output_size, 1); __ shrq(rax, 1); // two '='- Input:
"A"×64 + "="→ after processing the first 64-byte block, 1 byte remains (the lone=) - Output size calc:
output_size = (1/4)*3 = 0 - Padding adjustment:
decrementq(output_size, 1)→output_size = -1(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) - BZHI behavior:
bzhiq(-1, 0xFF…)— BZHI uses onlyindex[7:0]= 0xFF = 255. Since 255 ≥ 64 (register width), no bits are cleared → mask =0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF(all ones) - Masked store:
evmovdqubwith all-ones mask writes all 64 bytes of the ZMM register - Buffer math: Allocated buffer is 50 bytes, write starts at offset 48 → offsets 48–111 written → 62 bytes past the buffer end
- Exception:
IllegalArgumentExceptionis thrown after the write — the damage is done
- Byte 0: fully controlled
- Byte 1: 4 bits controlled
- Bytes 2–47: uncontrolled (decoded garbage)
- Bytes 48–63: always
0x9A - A positioned, mostly-fixed 64-byte smear
- Hash:
5177a70b385c - Bug ID: JDK-8393212: "Base64 optimization improvements" (benign title for embargoed fix)
- Authors: TobiHartmann, albertnetymk
- Authored: 2026-10-13, Committed: 2026-11-16
- Reviewed by: rhalade (Oracle Security), mschoene, chagedorn, rcastanedalo
- Change: +3 lines, 0 removed in
stubGenerator_x86_64.cpp
@@ address StubGenerator::generate_base64_decodeBlock() {
__ BIND(L_finalBit);
// Now have 1 to 63 bytes left to decode
+ // A padded Base64 tail shorter than one complete block is handled by Java.
+ __ cmpl(length, 4);
+ __ jcc(Assembler::less, L_bruteForce);The underflow only occurs when the tail is shorter than one complete 4-byte Base64 block (1–3 bytes). Guaranteeing length ≥ 4 before the masked path keeps output_size ≥ 3 after (n/4)*3, and the maximum padding adjustment is -2, so the minimum output_size for n ≥ 4 is 1 (never negative). Short tails divert to the bounds-correct L_bruteForce scalar decoder.
- Fix does NOT add bounds checking to
evmovdqubitself — a future code change could reintroduce similar - Fix does NOT address that
BZHIsilently wraps on out-of-range indices (x86 architectural behavior) - Fix IS sufficient:
(n/4)*3forn ≥ 4always ≥ 3, minus at most 2 = minimum 1
JDK-8321599 ("Data loss in AVX3 Base64 decoding", December 2023) — different bug in same intrinsic, incorrect source-offset causing data loss but NOT memory corruption.
From Calif.io disclosure. Weaponized chains withheld; treat details as unverified.
The 62-byte overflow corrupts an adjacent Java array's length field. The JVM then permits reads/writes beyond the array's true bounds. This upgrades a fixed-value overflow into a bounded, chosen-value linear write. Classic technique from JS engine exploitation.
Using the writer, corrupt a second array's length field. This reader array's contents are copied into an HTTP response, including heap data beyond the original bounds. Heartbleed-style disclosure — PII, session tokens, private keys.
G1 GC divides heap into fixed-size regions. Each thread gets a TLAB (private Eden slice). Attackers spray writer/reader pairs, use padding allocations to control layout, and retry on misses. Custom heap tracer/visualizer built to help the AI agent reason about heap state.
Request data sent in stages, waiting for TCP ACKs between stages to control allocation timing. Low, stable RTT preferred (Calif rented a VM in the target's region). nginx proxy_request_buffering can break timing for some chains but does NOT stop Elasticsearch. WebSocket frames bypass body buffering.
| Phase | Action |
|---|---|
| WARM | Valid Base64 decodes → trigger C2 JIT compilation of AVX-512 intrinsic |
| REHEARSE | Optional calibration round without corruption |
| TRIGGER | Malformed tail → 62-byte overflow corrupts writer array's length |
| DISCLOSE | Extend writer → corrupt reader → heap disclosure via response |
| REPAIR | Restore damaged headers/neighbors using disclosed original values |
| FINISH | Application-specific action, verify via live request |
Each target needs a bespoke profile: different allocation patterns, TLAB sizes, GC behavior, network stacks, auth flows. Probabilistic — multiple attempts may be needed. Failed attempts can crash the JVM.
| Java Line | Vulnerable Range | First Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| 17 | 17.0.6 – 17.0.21 | 17.0.21.1 |
| 21 | All before 21.0.13.1 | 21.0.13.1 |
| 25 | All before 25.0.5.1 | 25.0.5.1 |
| 27 | All before 27.0.1.1 | 27.0.1.1 |
| 11 | Not affected | N/A |
| 8 | Only Oracle SE 8u511b33-perf | N/A |
| CPU Family | AVX-512 VBMI? | Affected? |
|---|---|---|
| Intel Ice Lake+ (Xeon 3rd–6th Gen) | Yes | Yes |
| AMD EPYC Zen 4+ / Ryzen 7000+ | Yes | Yes |
| Intel Skylake/Cascade Lake | No VBMI | No |
| AMD Zen 1–3 | No | No |
| ARM64 (Graviton, Apple Silicon) | No | No |
| Any CPU under QEMU/Rosetta | No emulation | No |
Pre-auth RCE: Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins, PingFederate
Post-auth RCE: Kafka, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit, Spinnaker
Client-side: Java TLS client → malicious server (samczsun)
# CPU check (Linux) — all four flags required
grep -m1 '^flags' /proc/cpuinfo | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^(avx512f|avx512bw|avx512vbmi|bmi2)$'
# Java version check
java -version 2>&1
# Running JVM
jcmd <PID> VM.version
jcmd <PID> VM.flags -all | grep -E 'UseAVX|UseBASE64Intrinsics'
# Definitive: run the PoC
javac Base64Trigger.java && java Base64TriggerLog indicators: IllegalArgumentException from Base64, hs_err_pid*.log crash files, SIGSEGV in G1 GC, StubRoutines in crash stacks.
Upgrade (primary) → restart all JVMs, rebuild containers.
Interim — disable Base64 intrinsic (recommended):
java -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics MyAppInterim — disable AVX-512 (broader, x86-64 only):
java -XX:UseAVX=2 MyApp # DO NOT use on ARM — JVM fails to start| Heartbleed | Log4Shell | Spring4Shell | Java4Shell | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bug class | Over-read | Injection | Class manipulation | Integer underflow → heap overflow |
| Exploitation | Trivial | Trivial | Moderate | Complex, probabilistic |
| Universality | Any OpenSSL | Any Log4j 2.x | Spring+Tomcat+JDK9 | Per-target + HW-gated |
| HW dependency | None | None | None | AVX-512 VBMI |
| CVSS | 7.5 | 10.0 | 9.8 | 8.1–9.2 |
Novelty: Root cause in JIT-emitted assembly — invisible to Java SAST and dependency scanners. Exposure = runtime build + CPU, not classpath.
- Calif.io disclosure
- OpenJDK advisory
- Oracle CPU
- Fix commit 5177a70b385c (JDK-8393212)
- Vulnerable source
- JDK-8268276 — Original intrinsic
- JDK-8296735 — JDK 17 backport
- JDK-8321599 — Related prior fix
- Datadog Security Labs
- Semgrep
- JFrog
- Equixly
- Upwind / java4shell.net
- Hacker News
Product-specific exploitation chains withheld by Calif.io pending patch adoption.