[test] Add tests for config.NormalizeAllowOnlyReposValue

[github-actions]

Test Coverage Improvement: NormalizeAllowOnlyReposValue

• Package: internal/config
• Function: NormalizeAllowOnlyReposValue
• Previous coverage: 25.0%
• New coverage: 100.0%

Why

Lowest-coverage non-trivial function with a type switch and multiple validation branches (strings, []interface{}, []string, invalid types) that feeds policy normalization.

Tests added

Table-driven TestNormalizeAllowOnlyReposValue covering: all/public case and whitespace normalization, invalid strings, normalized+sorted slices (both slice types), empty slices, non-string entries, duplicates, all combined with other scopes, invalid and blank scopes, nil, and unsupported types.

go test ./internal/config -run TestNormalizeAllowOnlyReposValue passes.

Warning

Firewall blocked 4 domains

The following domains were blocked by the firewall during workflow execution:

• example.com
• nonexistent.local
• slow.example.com
• thishostdoesnotexist12345.com

To allow these domains, add them to the network.allowed list in your workflow frontmatter:

network:
  allowed:
    - defaults
    - "example.com"
    - "nonexistent.local"
    - "slow.example.com"
    - "thishostdoesnotexist12345.com"

See Network Configuration for more information.

Generated by Test Coverage Improver · copilot · auto · 19.1 AIC · ⊞ 10.6K · ◷

[Copilot]

🟢 Approval recommended

The tests accurately cover all branches and follow repository testing conventions.

0 open findings

What changed in this PR

Adds comprehensive unit coverage for allow-only repository value normalization.

Changes:

• Covers valid string and slice normalization.
• Covers invalid values, duplicates, empty slices, and unsupported types.

File	Description
internal/​config/​guard_policy_normalize_repos_test.go	Adds table-driven normalization and validation tests.

🧠 Review effort: Balanced

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[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — default

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: default AWF (normal container isolation)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads	data	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all 6 tools absent from 23-tool catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads	data	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment)	gh unauthenticated (no GH_TOKEN)	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	gh unauthenticated (no GH_TOKEN)	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

• No write succeeded anywhere — zero leak risk.
• Part B: the gateway's exposed catalog contains only 23 read-only tools (get_*, list_*, search_*, issue_read, pull_request_read); none of the 6 targeted write tools exist to call. This confirms gh-aw's GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1 backend wrapper but does not independently exercise mcpg's own DIFC/guard write-blocking layer, since no write-capable tool ever reaches it.
• Parts D/E: gh auth status shows no authenticated host (GH_TOKEN not set in this job), so REST/GraphQL write attempts could not even reach GitHub's API — the token-scope boundary was not exercised this run.
• No reaction, star, issue, comment, branch, file, or PR was created in any part.

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (default AWF runtime) by Read-Only Stress: default runtime