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project.yaml's additional_vars can set FUZZ_INPUTS, which was previously interpolated directly into a shell string via os.system(). Command substitution ($(...)) inside the directory path executes on the trusted task coordinator, not a sandboxed worker, since this runs before any worker RPC in the cleanup path. Switch to subprocess.run() with an argv list instead of a shell string, so the path can never be interpreted as shell syntax regardless of its contents. Preserves existing behavior (including the Windows branch and the shutil.rmtree fallback for files native deletion can't remove). Adds a regression test asserting a path containing shell metacharacters reaches subprocess.run() as a literal argv element. Ref: issuetracker.google.com/issues/569090261 (reported via OSS VRP, ruled out of scope due to the Oct 1 2026 policy change restricting product-vulnerability submissions - this patch is submitted via the contribution path instead)
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project.yaml's additional_vars can set FUZZ_INPUTS, which was previously interpolated directly into a shell string via os.system(). Command substitution ($(...)) inside the directory path executes on the trusted task coordinator, not a sandboxed worker, since this runs before any worker RPC in the cleanup path.
Switch to subprocess.run() with an argv list instead of a shell string, so the path can never be interpreted as shell syntax regardless of its contents. Preserves existing behavior (including the Windows branch and the shutil.rmtree fallback for files native deletion can't remove).
Adds a regression test asserting a path containing shell metacharacters reaches subprocess.run() as a literal argv element.
Ref: issuetracker.google.com/issues/569090261 (reported via OSS VRP, ruled out of scope due to the Oct 1 2026 policy change restricting product-vulnerability submissions - this patch is submitted via the contribution path instead)